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WORKSHOP ON TOOLS FOR 
NATECH RISK MANAGEMENT
DPRI, KYOTO UNIVERSITY 
WHAT IS A 
NATECH 
ACCIDENT? 
A Natech accident is a 
technological accident 
triggered by natural 
hazard events such as 
earthquakes, floods, 
storms, lightning, 
landslides, etc.  
In this context, a 
technological accident is 
understood as: 




 Damage to and
hazardous materials
releases from oil and
gas pipelines.
At least 50% of 
surveyed EU Member 
States and OECD 
Member Countries have 
experienced one or 
more Natech accidents, 
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This publication was put together by a group of international experts under the
auspice of the Disaster Prevention Research Institute (DPRI), Kyoto University.  
Its content reflects the multi-perspective contributions and international experiences
presented at Kyoto University, Uji Campus, in March 2017, within the framework of 
the Workshop on Tools for Natech Risk Management. 
We would like to thank the workshop speakers Prof. Kaoru Takara, Director, DPRI, 
Kyoto University; Prof. Shin-ichi Aoki, Osaka University; Mr. Jaime Pacheco, First 
Secretary of the Colombian Embassy in Japan; Ms. María Camila Suarez, DPRI; Prof. 
Felipe Muñoz Giraldo, Universidad de los Andes, Colombia; Dr. Elizabeth Krausmann, 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Italy; Prof. Valerio Cozzani, Università 
di Bologna, Italy; Prof. Ernesto Salzano, Università di Bologna, Italy; Emeritus Prof. 
Naomi Kato, Osaka University, Japan; Dr. Tomoaki Nishino, Building Research 
Institute, Japan; Prof. Mauricio Sánchez, Universidad de los Andes, Colombia; and 
Dr. Takeshi Komino, CWS, Japan.  
We would also like to acknowledge the contribution of the members of the Disaster
Risk Management Laboratory (Cruz Lab) to the preparation of this report under the 
guidance of Prof. Felipe Munoz Giraldo. 
The Natech Workshop was partly funded by the Disaster Prevention Research
Institute, Kyoto University, for which we are grateful.  
About the Disaster Risk Management Laboratory (Cruz Lab): 
Our lab is multidisciplinary, integrating skills and knowledge from a variety of
disciplines such as engineering, sociology, economics, and disaster risk management 
(DRM), benefiting synergistically by working in association with local, national and 
international students, researchers and faculty (www.natech.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp). Cruz 
Lab is part of the Center for Disaster Reduction Systems (DRS) at DPRI, Kyoto 
University. Its purpose is to promote research and practices to build a safe and resilient




The Workshop on Tools for Natech Risk Management was organized and hosted by the 
Disaster Prevention Research Institute (DPRI) at Kyoto University, Uji Campus, on 
March13th 2017. The Natech workshop was carried out in an effort to do a hands-on 
practical demonstration of some available tools for Natech risk assessment, risk mitigation 
and emergency operations planning for various types of natural hazards. The workshop 
was attended by participants from 12 countries, including experts, students and 
stakeholders involved in Natech disaster risk reduction and similar topics.  
The event included talks on available Natech tools, their strengths, implementation and 
development of case studies. A discussion of key elements and needs in the Natech context 
was the way to conclude the workshop. Identification of priorities, gaps and future 









On 13th March 2017, the Disaster Prevention Research Institute (DPRI, Kyoto
University) hosted the Workshop on Tools for Natech Risk Management. Participants 
included representatives from Afghanistan, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Egypt,
Germany, Japan, India, Italy, Mexico, South Korea and Philippines (see Annex 4). The
event was opened by the Director of the Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Prof. 
Kaoru Takara; Prof. Ana Maria Cruz, DPRI, KU; Prof. Shin-ichi Aoki, Osaka University; 
and Mr. Jaime Pacheco, First Secretary of the Colombian Embassy in Japan. Prof. 
Takara highlighted Natech’s place in the Sendai framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.
During the opening ceremony speakers remarked the fact that Natech is a very
recent concept and mentioned the need to better understand its complex accidental 
dynamics within interdisciplinary teams. They encouraged researchers to continue 
working towards prevention, mitigation and protection measures. The Colombian 







State of the Art in Natech Risk Management 
María Camila Suarez, DPRI; Felipe Muñoz Giraldo, Universidad de los Andes 
Colombia; Ana Maria Cruz, DPRI 
This presentation was given by María Camila Suarez, a Ph.D. 
student at DPRI. She presented the state of the art in Natech Risk 
Management based on two stages of analysis. The first stage 
focused on a review of the literature concerning potential Natech 
accidents, mainly an apriori approach, and the second stage 
focused on a review of the literature concerning past Natech 
events, a posteriori approach. Classification by hazards and 
different types of analysis for the methodologies proposed so far 
has been conducted. The findings demonstrated the necessity for 
further research and outlined the way forward on this relatively 
recent topic.   
RAPID-N: Earthquake Natech Risk Assessment 
Elisabeth Krausmann, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Italy 
RAPID-N is a web based semi-quantitative tool for Natech risk 
assessment and mapping developed by the Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) of the European Commission. Rapid-N includes an 
integrated methodology able to analyze Natech risks by 
estimating the natural-hazard severity (e.g. earthquake) at a 
hazardous site, the damage caused by the natural hazard using 
fragility curves, and the consequences of the damage. The results 
give an overview of the impacted area around the accident site 
with respect to heat radiation and toxic concentrations. The JRC 
is the science body of the European Commission. Its mandate is to 
support policy making by providing scientific guidance to the 
European Commission. Through its activities, the JRC also supports 
EU Member States and operators in the identification and 






Natech Quantitative Risk Assessment by the ARIPAR software 
Valerio Cozzani, LISES-DICAM, Università di Bologna, Italy 
Natech events are characterized by a high level of complexity. 
They are categorized among the high impact, low probability 
events. As a consequence, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of 
Natechs is a challenging issue. The ARIPAR-GIS tool was 
developed under the ARIPAR project, which started since 1988. 
ARIPAR-GIS considers the impact area, vulnerability centers, 
demographics, meteorology and a combination of scenarios (e.g. 
10,000-200,000 combination of scenarios) to give risk indexes 
as an output.  For each risk source, event and failure trees are 
used, as well as geographical information. Vulnerability maps of 
the final scenarios are managed by the software. It has been 
applied to analyze several Italian industrial areas and it has 
proved to be a robust tool. The first complete approach to 
Natech QRA was published in 2007, but it needed a computational tool. As a 
consequence, ARIPAR-GIS has now been modified to implement a specific method for 
Natech QRA, allowing the calculation of the specific contribution of Natech scenarios to 
the overall industrial risk figures.  
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Quantitative Assessment of Earthquake and Tsunami Natech 
scenarios 
Ernesto Salzano, Università di Bologna, Italy  
The complexity of Natech scenarios is such that Quantitative Risk 
Assessment requires a complex, multi-disciplinary analysis, 
involving several engineering and natural science disciplines. 
Under the STREST project, the fishbone diagram of industrial risk 
analysis was adopted and natural hazards and their interactions 
incorporated in order to analyze a case study of a refinery in 
Milazzo, Italy. Earthquake and Tsunami were the natural hazards 
considered. Thus, Probabilistic Seismic and Tsunami Hazard 
Analysis (PSHA) were developed. Results were obtained using 
the Risk Curves/Effect TNO tool. The results given by the tool are 
based on available standards for vulnerability and for 
consequence analysis. Therefore, they can only be used for comparative purposes and 
as preliminary inputs for land use planning. It was concluded that the general complexity 
of Natech scenarios, which includes natural hazard analysis, is partially reduced by the 
similarities industrial facilities share worldwide and the availability of data associated to 






Oil and Gas Releases during Large Earthquakes and Tsunami 
Shin-ichi Aoki and Naomi Kato, Osaka University, Japan 
Osaka bay is exposed to several hazards such as floods, 
earthquakes, tsunami and storm surge. The consequences of oil 
and gas releases due to a large earthquake and associated 
tsunami in Osaka Bay represent a high risk for industrial facilities 
and neighboring communities. Thus, a research initiative for 
Disaster Prevention of Petrochemical Complexes (industrial parks) 
which includes the case study of the Sakai-Senboku industrial 
area, has been presented. Onshore and offshore propagation of 
damages were considered, although consequences and impacts 
were mostly present offshore. Numerical simulations of tsunami 
propagation and dispersion of spilt oil, including oil spill from 
storage tanks due to sloshing using Meshless Moving Particle Semi-
implicit (MPS) method were developed. Furthermore, laboratory 
experiments on tsunami-induced hydrodynamic forces at the 
harbor and 2D experiments on wave forces acting on a tank have been used in order to 
validate a proposed model, considering similarities and scale effects. Community-
engagement initiatives have also been carried out exchanging opinions with residents 
near the industrial park areas. Finally, countermeasures that are being developed such 
as reduction of tsunami energy by flexible pipes and blocking tsunami by an earth bank 
were presented.  
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Development of Simulation Tool for Fire Spread on Floating Oil 
in Tsunamis  
Tomoaki Nishino, Building Research Institute, Japan  
 The tsunami following the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake 
caused spreading of fires at Kesennuma Bay. A large quantity of 
oil, which had been spilled from destroyed oil tanks, contributed 
to such tsunami-induced fires. Some of the fires ignited tsunami 
refuge buildings, and people who had escaped to the buildings 
from the tsunami were exposed to the fires. In addition, the fires 
spread to forests, resulting in wildfires involving 231 ha. These 
facts have raised concern among people whom must evacuate for 
future tsunamis of the risk from tsunami-induced fires. 
Nevertheless, adequante measures have not yet been taken in 
recent disaster prevention planning, because there is no method 
for predicting the big picture of tsunami-induced fires. 
The Building Research Institute has been developing a 
computational model for fire spread on floating oil in tsunamis. The model regards the 
spreading fires on the sea as an assembly of burning floating oil particles, and tracks the 
burning zone by predicting the locations and combustion behaviors of individual particles 
in time series. The spreading fires on Kesennuma Bay were numerically analyzed. As a 
result, it was concluded that the qualitative trend of the fire spread was well predicted 
by the model, compared with the actual conditions which were determined from film 
records and survey data. 
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19 
Landslide and Pipeline Natech Risk Assessment Tool 
Mauricio Sánchez and Felipe Muñoz Giraldo, Universidad de los Andes, 
Colombia 
A quantitative-mechanistic model for assessing the probability 
of failure along pipelines due to their interaction with 
landslides, named GeoRisks was presented. The objective was 
to develop an integrated model to evaluate the risk of pipeline 
subjected to multiple natural hazards. The importance of 
managing problem complexity was considered. Topography, 
geotechnical information, hydrology, and pipeline information 
have been considered in the analysis. Cost analysis was also 
presented with a particular focus on cost-efficient design. 
Finally, criteria for risk management and structured hierarchical 






Radiation Measurement for Protection of Children in Fukushima 
Takeshi Komino, CWS, Japan 
This presentation focused on the important question of how to 
mitigate nuclear-related risks analyzing the position of the 
government and providing real-time data. The presentation 
showed that under the Technical Hazards Working Session of the 
Sendai Framework, a call for transparent disclosure of risks was 
made. The question on “how are the lessons from Fukushima being 
used to mitigate future losses?” was the starting point to develop 
the project for Sharing Lessons and Protecting the Vulnerable 
communities. As a result, a method that is used to measure 
individual levels of radiation in Fukushima was developed. The 
tool has been used to identify radiation hotspot, particularly in 
schools and other public areas which then leads to on-the-spot decontamination efforts 
led by local government.  
The NGO CWS Japan operation pillars are related to humanitarian development 
assistance, advocacy and capacity building, and it works with a NGO called Shalom on 
the project presented. 
21
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Discussion and Wrap-up Panel Session 
Chair: Ana Maria Cruz 
Panelists: Elisabeth Krausmann, Ernesto Salzano, Valerio Cozzani, Takeshi 
Komino, Tomoaki Nishino, Naomi Kato, Felipe Muñoz, Mauricio Sánchez. 
The discussion and wrap-up panel session was the opportunity to evaluate overall 
awareness concerning Natech risks, assess research achievements and gaps, and 
delineate the main conclusions from the Workshop. The panelists agreed that awareness 
concerning Natechs risks has increased. It was also mentioned that there is a need for 
interaction between people from different disciplines and exchanges within different 
geographical areas in order to provide guidance for industrial plants and local 
governments. As a consequence, integrated and useful models are needed to help 
decision makers take the right decisions. However, several issues remain unsolved such as 
how to use and interpret model results to adequately inform decision making.  
All the panelists agreed that uncertainty characterization is a central issue. It needs to 
be further addressed and explained, in order to have models that serve a purpose and 
can be implemented by authorities and stakeholders. One of the panelists noted “Models 
may not yet address uncertainties and are not yet dynamic”. But the question on how to 
include changeability, adaptability and flexibility in these models is still not resolved. For 
example, issues related to infrastructure deterioration and depreciation over time are not 
yet incorporated in current risk assessment models.  
The importance of estimating economic losses from Natech accidental scenarios and the 
need to have more precise estimation tools which consider direct and indirect damages 
and losses was highlighted.  
Another aspect that was discussed during the session was data availability. Several 
panelists manifested the need to have databases based on detailed descriptions of past 
accident scenarios, and agreed efforts to promote data sharing and recording is crucial 
for lessons learning. Another problem identified is the need to work towards improved 
risk communication and disclosure of risk information by industry to potentially affected 
communities. Thus, a call was made for inclusion of more social science approaches and 
risk communication fields in future Natech studies.  
One of the participants noted that Natech risk management focuses on industrial aspects 
and exposure, but that it is also a risk governance problem. Risk management is in the 
hands of industries or though policies by government officials. Will power from 
22
23 
government officials is needed. In developing countries, the problems are even greater 
due to lack of economic and human resources, and so on. The need for an international 
standard for Natech risk management, and the importance of constructing an international 
framework on Natechs was noted. In this context, the question concerning “What are key 
criteria needed for a Natech performance rating system?” was raised. The answers 
provide by the panelists and participants touched upon several issues including:   
 Awareness about the problem
 Identification of exposure to hazards
 Knowledge creation (chemicals, quantities, etc.)
 Definition of natural hazard and level of risk
 Facilities should look at events beyond design level
 Emergency response (not captured by QRA)
 Emergency planned made by public authority.
 Early warning /forecasting in case of storms, flood etc.
 Incentives for companies
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1 High Pressure Gas Safety Institute Japan KHK 2005- Present
2 National Response Centre NRC 1990-Present
3 US Environmental Protection Agency in the ERNS database ERNS 1986-1995
4 Incident Reporting Information System IRIS
5 Major Accidents Reporting Systems eMARS 1982-Present
6 Toxic Release Inventory database TRI 1997-2015
7 Failure and ACcidents Technical information System FACTS 1597-2014
8  European Strong Motion Database ESD 1967-2008
9
Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance HSEES 1993-2009
10 Analysis, Research and Information on Accidents database ARIA 1992-Present
11 Major Hazard Incident Data Service MHIDAS 2001-2014
12 The Accident Database TAD
13 Association of Bay Area Governments Resilience Program* ABAG 1990-1992
14 Japan National Police Agency NPA Present
15 RigLogix database RigLogix 2000-Present
16
eNATECH (Natural Hazard - Triggered Technological 
Accidents)
e-Natech Present
17 The International Disaster Database Emdat 1900-Present
18 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA 1970-Present
19
A large database of earthquake-induced damage for steel 
and non-steel pipelines Lanzano et al 2015-Present
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Tools (Natech + Others)





Developed to support needs and close gaps in risk assessment,





No. Tool name Approach
1
Advanced Disaster Management 
Simulator (ADMS).
Emergency Management Simulation 
2 Guardian Centers Training in natural and manmade disasters
3
The Finding Individuals for Disaster and 
Emergency Response (FINDER)
Natural phenomenon (earthquakes and avalanches)
4 Climada (Catastrophe modeling) Probabilistic multi-hazard risk assessment 
5 SNOWPACK Multi-purpose snow and land-surface model
6 RAPID-N Natech risk mapping
7 PANR Preliminary Assessment of Natech Risk in urban areas.
8
TRAS 310 Technical Rules on Process 
Safety (TRAS)
Precautions and Measures Against the Hazard Sources Precipitation and 
Flooding
9 TRAS 320
Precautions and Measures Against the Hazard Sources Wind, Snow Loads and 
Ice Loads
10 TRAT-GIS
Quantitative risk assessment computational tool applied to the land transport 
of dangerous goods
11 Tsunami-Induced Fire Spread Simulation Tsunami consequences
12
Landslide and pipeline Natech Risk 
Assessment Tool
Quantitative-mechanistic model for assessing the probability of failure along 
pipelines due to their interaction with landslides
13
ARIPAR GIS - Software Tool for Area Risk 
Assessment and Management
Quantitative area risk assessment tool to evaluate the risk from major accidents 
in industrial areas where hazardous substances are stored, processed and 
transported. 
14
Tool for Assessment of Radiation 
Hotspots
Assessment of radiation hot spot using Hot Spot Finder and linking it to 
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Precautions and Measures Against the Hazard Sources Wind, Snow Loads and 
Ice Loads
10 TRAT-GIS
Quantitative risk assessment computational tool applied to the land transport 
of dangerous goods
11 Tsunami-Induced Fire Spread Simulation Tsunami consequences
12
Landslide and pipeline Natech Risk 
Assessment Tool – GeoRisk
Quantitative-mechanistic model for assessing the probability of failure along 
pipelines due to their interaction with landslides
13
ARIPAR GIS - Software Tool for Area Risk 
Assessment and Management
Quantitative area risk assessment tool to evaluate the risk from major accidents 
in industrial areas where hazardous substances are stored, processed and 
transported. 
14
Tool for Assessment of Radiation 
Hotspots
Assessment of radiation hot spot using Hot Spot Finder and linking it to 




No. Tool name Approach
1 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction Disaster Risk Reduction
2
International Search and Rescue Advisory 
Group (INSARAG)
Earthquakes
3 Global Environments Network (GEN) Seeks solutions to environmental and social problems
4
Real-Time Wireless Sensor Network for
Landslide Monitoring
Landslides
5 STOP DISASTERS! Disaster simulation game. Natural disasters
6 Nepal 2015 Earthquakes Characterising the post-seismic behaviour of damaged slopes
7 TANAH - the tsunami and earthquake fighter Tsunami
8
PreventionWeb - Information needs of the DRR 
community
Multihazard
Disaster Risk Reduction 
9 Flood Resilience Portal Flood
10 Practical Action
App  used as a Technical Information Service
Rebuilding in the Aftermath of an Earthquake
Seismic Resistant Retrofitting for Buildings
11 Missing map project Map up of vulnerable areas before the disaster occurs
12 Flash Environmental Assessment Tool (FEAT)
First aid impact assessment and response prioritization tool, aimed to
be used immediately after a chemical incident anywhere in the world.
13 The Hazard Identification Tool (HIT) 
Support tool for first responders to identify and address secondary 
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Æ Support the EU Member States and operators in the 
identification and reduction of Natech risk
Stakeholders:
Æ EU Member States, candidate and neighbour countries, 
third countries; European Commission Services; OECD, 
UNEP/OCHA, UNISDR 
Activities:





Accident analysis and guidance
• Identification of vulnerable equipment (fixed,
pipelines, offshore), scenarios and consequences 
(earthquakes, floods, lightning, hurricanes)
• Site surveys for Natech damage assessment
(Japan, China) & statistical analysis, lessons 
learning
• Natech accident database: eNatech
http://enatech.jrc.ec.europa.eu
Risk analysis tools 





• Natech risk maps are considered a high priority need for:
 Identification of Natech-prone areas (land-use planning)
 Emergency-response planning
• Hardly any Natech risk maps exist in the EU/OECD
 Simple overlay of natural hazards and industrial facilities
 Do not consider site-specific features
• Expected release scenarios
• Existing safety measures
Æ Development of a unified Natech risk assessment and 
mapping methodology and implementation as a software tool
3737
7Rapid-N Natech Risk Assessment & 
Mapping Framework
• Integrated methodology
• Natural Hazard  +  Accident
• Rapid assessment
• Local and regional analysis
• Publicly available
• Multilingual web service
• User friendly application



















































































• Automated unit conversion






• Minimize data requirement
• Increase flexibility




• Natural hazard: e.g. PGA
• Site: e.g. Soil class
• Facility: e.g. Capacity
• Process unit: e.g. Volume
• Substance: e.g. Density
• Data
• Numerical (with unit)







e.g. Ambient temperature = 20oC
• Function estimator
e.g. Volume = ∏ x Radius2 x Height
• Validity conditions
e.g. Shape = Cylindrical
• Validity regions
e.g. Location in Europe
16
Property Estimation Framework
Building Blocks Tool Kit Model
17
Property Estimation Framework
• Minimizes data input
• Estimates missing data
• Increases flexibility








































• Non-linear DS-RS relations
• Damage parameters, e.g.:
• Natech event (e.g. BLEVE)
• Conditional probability (e.g. 50%)










• Currently implemented for 
earthquakes and fixed installations 
and pipelines
• ~ 20,000 earthquakes (> M 5.5)
• ~ 10,000 shakemaps
• > 5,500 industrial facilities
• Refineries
• Power plants
• > 64,000 plant units
• Storage tanks
• Complete implementation of 













• JICA (2002) Model A
• Epicenter
• 40㼻45.00'N 29㼻24.00'E
• Focal depth 10 km
• Fault






• Located in Izmit Bay
• Fiber production






Risk Assessment – Kerosene
Substance Kerosene
Tank Type Cylindrical Vertical




Dike area 22 m x 24 m
Dike volume 830 m³
Fill level 60%
Filled volume 1238 m³




DS2 Minor damage, no release
DS3 Moderate damage, minor release
DS4 Severe damage, major release
DS5 Collapse, loss of content
Con equence: Pool fi e
End-point: 2nd degree burns (40s exp.)
DS1 No release
DS2 No release
DS3 1.24 m³ release
248 m² pool (within dike)
69 m end-point distance
S4 619 m³ release
415 m² pool (within dike)
90 m end-point distance
DS5 1238 m³ release
8588 m² pool (dike overflow)













Risk Assessment – Acrylonitrile
Tank Type Cylindrical vertical





Dike area 50 m x 50 m
Dike volume 4020 m³
Fill level 80%
Filled volume 6200 m³








DS2 Minor damage, no release
DS3 Moderate damage, minor release
DS4 Severe damage, major release
DS5 Collapse, loss of content
Co sequ nce: Atmospheric dispersion
End-point: ERPG-2 (0.076 mg/L)
DS1 No release
S2 No release
DS3 62 m³ release
1238 m² pool (within dike)
1.29 km end-point distance
DS4 3100 m³ release
2009 m² pool (within dike)
1.93 km end-point distance
DS5 6200 m³ release
8588 m² pool (dike overflow)
3.38 km end-point distance









Pipeline Natech Risk Assessment
• Prototype completed in 2016















• Automated POI generation
• Impact zone consolidation
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Flood Natech Risk Assessment
• 1st Phase of the prototype is
completed (MAHB-ECHO AA 2015-2016)
• Collection of scientific and
technical knowledge
• Methodologies







Flood Natech Risk Assessment
• EFAS/RAPID-N interoperability
(JRC Technical Report JRC105055)
• Benefits
• Flood hazard data for natech
risk assessment
• Natech risk data for emergency
management
• Flood forecasts Æ Natech Alert
• Data sharing/cooperation
between JRC systems
RAPID-N: Ongoing and future research
• Extension to other natural hazards and infrastructures
 Pipelines (ongoing), Floods (ongoing), Lightning (planned)
• Automated Natech damage and consequence estimation (Alert)
 Reporting to interested parties and authorities
• Cascading effects









Quantitative Risk Assessment 
by the ARIPAR software
Valerio Cozzani
LISES – DICAM




Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
LISES - DICAM @ University of Bologna
• University of Bologna: funded 
in 1088: the oldest university 
in the western world
• 11 Schools, 33 Departments 
2800 faculty members, 
80000+ students
• One of the largest and best
reputed Italian universities
• An international centre of 
competence for research in 
Safety of Industrial Activities
• Specific competences on 
external hazard factors and 
cascading events
3
Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Natech Events: definition
 Natural events (earthquake, 
floods, etc.)  may cause damage 
to industrial installations and 
infrastructures
 Damage caused by natural events 
may start the release of hazardous 
substances triggering a 
technological accident
 These cascading events are 
defined “Natech” scenarios
(Natural hazard triggering 
Technological disasters)
 NaTech scenarios are potentially 
high impact – low probability 
(HILP) events
4
Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy










Conventional scenarios falling 
inside experience of operators 
and safety managers  
Iso-Risk Curve
5
Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Complexity of Scenarios
 A high number of multiple simultaneous or
alternative events may result from a Natech
sequence:
1. A natural event occurs (usually impacting on a wide 
area)
2. At least one (possibly more than one) equipment item
(storage tank, reactor, distillation column, pipe, 
etc.) is damaged
3. Dangerous substances (flammable, toxic, reactive 
with water, dangerous for environment) are released
4. Each release may result in alternative final scenarios 
depending on boundary conditions (ignition sources, 
meteo conditions, etc.)
5. Multiple simultaneous final scenario may cause 
further escalation (domino effects)
6
Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Complexity of impact vector
 Some hazards
(e.g. flood) may 
require detailed 
characterization 
and may be 
strongly 
depending on 
position even in 
the scale of 10m
4343
7Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Complexity of impact area
 Residential area and industrial facilities may have 






Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Barriers
 Barriers may be present to cascading events
 Barriers may be affected as well by the natural event (common 
cause failure)
 The presence of barriers as well as their possible failure needs to 












Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Quantitative Assessment of Natech
 Quantitative assessment of Natech scenarios deals with:
1. HILP events - falling outside common experience of
analysts and responders
2. A high number of complex overall scenarios -
simultaneous events, alternative final scenarios,
escalation
3. Complex characterization of hazard
4. Complex description of impact area
5. Need to include non-perfect barriers in the analysis and 
early warning systems
 Quantitative Risk Assessment is usually applied to cope
with a high number of scenarios having different 
credibility
 Geographical Information Systems (GIS) software is 
adopted to deal with the detailed characterization of 
complex areas
10
Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Risk Assessment and Management:
Risk 
Assessment
Even if QRA is 
a tool widely 









Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool




 individual risk per
annum (IRPA)
 Societal risk: F/N
curves
 Societal risk: I-N
histogram
 Societal risk:
Potential Life Loss 
(PLL)






















Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
QRA of Natech events
First complete QRA of a Natech event was published in 2007
G. Antonioni, G. Spadoni, V. Cozzani: A methodology for the quantitative risk 
assessment of major accidents triggered by seismic events. J. Hazardous 
Materials 147 (2007) 48–59
Early studies date back to 2003 and 2005:
G. Fabbrocino, I. Iervolino, F. Orlando, E. Salzano: Quantitative risk analysis of 
oil storage facilities in seismic areas, J. Hazard. Mater. 123 (2005) 61-69
4444
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Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
First complete application of QRA to Natech was supported by the 
ARIPAR-GIS software
The ARIPAR-GIS software
The use of a software tool 
is required to carry our 
complete calculations
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Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
9 In 1988 the ARIPAR project was launched (Analysis of
Risks in the Industrial Area and Port of Ravenna - Italy)
9 ARIPAR project is ambitious for the time: detailed
characterization of industrial risk
9 Several qualified public and private stakeholders
participated: EC Joint Research Centre, University of
Bologna, Civil Protection, Snamprogetti….
9 1990: ARIPAR software is launched
9 1996: first development of GIS interface
9 1996-2000: GIS interface continuously improved
9 2003: prototype for the assessment of domino effect
9 2005: prototype for the assessment of Natech events
The ARIPAR-GIS software
15
Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
The ARIPAR-GIS software
Main module of 
ARIPAR is set for the 
characterization of 




Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Scanned Map Map to scale
Documents







The GIS interface allows the
organization of detailed data




Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
 ARIPAR-GIS was applied to the detailed analysis of
several extended industrial areas in Italy
The ARIPAR-GIS software
18
Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
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Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy





Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Risk Sources
 Detailed characterization of risk sources from fixed 
installations and transport systems
22
Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
 For each risk source an event tree and vulnerability 
















Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
ARIPAR-GIS: Natech module
¬ The ARIPAR-GIS software was modified to 
implement Natech “bow-tie”
¬ The specific procedure for Natech QRA by Cozzani 
et al. was implemented (Cozzani et al., J. Loss Prev. 













Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Detailed assessment
 Natech QRA was derived
from that developed for
domino effect assessment
 Results can be compared 
with those of baseline 
QRA
 Method is based on the 
use of equipment 
vulnerability models:
Campedel et al., Risk Analysis 28:1231-1246 
(2008)
Antonioni et al., Reliability Eng.Sys.Saf. 
142:334-345 (2015)
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AT_A1-3 2 Continuous (50mm RD) Pool fire (PD 12m) 5.10-5 6.5 
3 Instantaneous Pool fire (PD 70m) 5.10-6 6.5
AT_B1-6 2 Continuous (50mm RD) Pool fire (PD 11m) 5.10-5 6.5 
3 Instantaneous Pool fire (PD 66m) 5.10-6 6.5
AT_B7-8 2 Continuous (50mm RD) Pool fire (PD 12m) 5.10-5 6.5 
3 Instantaneous Pool fire (PD 70m) 5.10-6 6.5
PV_A1-6 2 Continuous (10 min. release) Jet Fire 5.10-7 50
2 Continuous (10 min. release) VCE 5.10-7 2.5
2 Continuous (10 min. release) Flash-fire 5.10-7 2.5
3 Instantaneous Fireball 5.10-7 50
3 Instantaneous VCE 5.10-7 2.5
3 Instantaneous Flash-fire 5.10-7 2.5
PV_B1-5 2 Continuous (10 min. release) Jet Fire 5.10-7 50
2 Continuous (10 min. release) VCE 5.10-7 2.5
2 Continuous (10 min. release) Flash-fire 5.10-7 2.5
3 Instantaneous Fireball 5.10-7 50
3 Instantaneous VCE 5.10-7 2.5
3 Instantaneous Flash-fire 5.10-7 2.5
AT_F1-5 2 Continuous (50mm RD) Pool fire (PD 15m) 5.10-5 6.5 
3 Instantaneous Pool fire (PD 60m) 5.10-6 6.5
AT_G1 2 Continuous (50mm RD) Pool fire (PD 12m) 5.10-5 6.5 
3 Instantaneous Pool fire (PD 40m) 5.10-6 6.5
PV_A1-8 2 Continuous (10 min. release) Jet Fire 5.10-7 50
2 Continuous (10 min. release) VCE 5.10-7 2.5
2 Continuous (10 min. release) Flash-fire 5.10-7 2.5
3 Instantaneous Fireball 5.10-7 50
3 Instantaneous VCE 5.10-7 2.5
3 Instantaneous Flash-fire 5.10-7 2.5
¬ Reference 
scenarios were 





¬ A reference lay-
out for a tank 
farm of an oil 
refinery was 
considered
Example of ARIPAR-GIS application:
Seismic-induced accidents
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Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool














unanchored tanks, Near full
anchored tanks, Near full
no seismic risk
¬ Increase of 1 to 2 orders of 
magnitude of individual risk
¬ Strong increase in societal risk 
(in particular for high N values)
Not including seismic events
Including seismic events
Example 1: Seismic-induced accidents
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Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Case-Study 1: Romenia, seismic
Probabilistic hazard map – 475 years recurrence period (Sokolov et al., 2007)
28
Natech Tools Workshop 
Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Tanks considered in the study (yellow) and the residential area (red)
47
29
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Kyoto, Japan, March 13, 2017
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Results and discussions
¾ The simulations of VCEs showed no results due to the low 
congestion of the lay-out considered. 
¾ The flash fire simulations showed results only in case of 
unfavourable meteorological conditions (Pasquill stability class F; 1 
m/s wind speed) – no lethal effects at the residential area. 
¾ The confined explosion simulations did not show significant effects
for the residential area. 
¾ Only fires in bunds can present dangerous consequences for the 
population in the residential area, therefore only these were 
considered further in the IR and SR calculations.
Red zone: flame surface
Dark orange: 12.5 kW/m2
Light orange: 5 kW/m2
Yellow: 2.5 kW/m2
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Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Individual Risk
Local-specific Individual Risk comparison
a) IR considering only internal 
technological causes 
b) Total IR considering internal 
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 Pressurized and atmospheric tank farm
Case Study 3: Italy, Flood
Vessel features
Pressurized vessels Atmospheric vessels
P1 to P9 P10 to P16 P17 P18 to P20 P21 to P23 S1 T1-T4 T5-T8
Nominal capacity (m3) 50 30 115 150 100 3179 6511 6511
Substance contained Propylene Propane LPG Ammonia Chlorine Organic solvent Gasoline Benzene
Physical state Liquefied gas Liquefied gas Liquefied gas Liquefied gas Liquefied gas Liquid Liquid Liquid
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Conventional QRA
Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
 LSIR profile increases up to three order of magnitude with 
respect to the QRA with conventional scenarios
 Frequency increment due to high severity of selected flooding
W
㻜 㻝 㻞 㻟 㻠 㻡 㻢 㻣 㻤 㻥 㻝㻜 㻝㻝 㻝㻞 㼗㼙
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relevant severity of toxic releases
1.E-02











failures of chlorine 
tanks
Societal Risk: F-N Curve
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Natech Tools Workshop 
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Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Conclusions /1
 ARIPAR-GIS software proved to be a robust tool to 
support Natech QRA
 Results obtained by the approach from different
applications in Europe seem coherent
 The results provide a detailed quantification of Natech
risk even for complex impact areas and complex 
scenarios
 Quantitative assessment of Natech risk supports 
decision making and captures the effect of safety 
barriers
36
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Natech Quantitative Assessment by ARIPAR tool
V. Cozzani, University of Bologna, Italy
Conclusions /2
 ARIPAR-GIS addresses detailed risk assessment: it is not
a screening tool
 QRA requires expert users and a deep knowledge of 
models, in particular when addressing consequence 
analysis
 Uncertainty needs to be managed when detailed
approaches are developed
 Risk results are highly dependent on natural hazard
characterization
 Equipment vulnerability model are the key element
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QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF EARTHQUAKE AND
TSUNAMI NATECH SCENARIOS
A CASE STUDY OF A REFINERY IN ITALY
ERNESTO SALZANO
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Consequences for Workers and Population (toxic dispersion, fire, explosion) 







Deepwater Horizon: after burning for 36 hours
the rig sank on April 22, 2010
Technological risks
 The pipe that channeled oil 1,400 metres up from the sea floor spewed out in 5 
million barrels of oil (twice as big as the largest oil spill event ever)  in 3 months


















Risk recomposition Measures to reduce the risk
Technical
Technological failure
The fishbone of industrial risk (AIChE – CCPS)
Loss of 
content Risk
Component Level System Level
QRA: a complex, multi-disciplinary analysis, 
involving several engineering disciplines
5050
7The Aripar flowsheet for QRA, with domino effects
Quantitative Risk Assessment
The RiskCurves/Effects flowsheet for QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
LOCAL, INDIVIDUAL OR LOCATIONAL RISK: Isorisk curves giving the annual risk of death 
or serious injury to which specific individuals are exposed
SOCIETAL RISK (F/N Curves): The cumulative frequency (F) of incidents which can lead, 
on the whole impact area, to a number of fatalities higher than the given value N
Quantitative Risk Assessment Natural-Technological risks




Total or partial unavailability of:
 Utilities: electric power, cooling water, ..
 Safety barriers: firefighting water, ..




Consequences for Workers and Population (toxic dispersion, fire, explosion) 
Consequences for the Environment (natural disaster, pollution)
Natural-Technological risks
Earthquake/Tsnuami Japan (2011): Ichihara – Chiba Refinery
Earthquake/Tsnuami Japan (2011): Ichihara – Chiba Refinery
Non-Nuclear scenario, Sendai Earthquake Tsunami
Main issues: 
 Overloading of emergency system 
 Fuel losses
 Post-event environmental effects 
Natural-Technological risks
Earthquake/Tsnuami Japan (2011): Ichihara – Chiba Refinery
DOMINO EFFECTS
Emergency response in Ichihara was still able to cope with industrial accident despite 








Structural damage of equipment containing large 
amount of hazardous materials






















Component Level System Level
QRA: a complex, multi-disciplinary 
analysis, involving several engineering 











The description of earthquake effects is not straightforward!
Several induced and concomitant phenomena can occur, as:
 Far field effects (seismic shaking) (PGA, PGV)
 Near fault effects (PGA, PGV)










An example of seismic hazard curve (50-year Poissonian probability of exceedance) in terms of Peak 
Ground Acceleration, PGA [E. H. Field, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) - A Primer]
h(PGA)


















Damage State (DS): Performance levels based on structural damage
DS1 - absence of structual damage 
DS2 - slight damages to structures 
DS3 - moderate structual damages
DS4 - Extensive damage to structures
DS5 - total collapse of structure
Main scope:
Return-to-Service









For each Damage State (DS) for a specific structure, a structural vulnerability 
(fragility function) in terms of  the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function for the Intensity Measure (IM) of earthquake can be defined as:
Natech Risk: Earthquake
For each Risk State (RS) and for any specific equipment containing 
hazardous materials, a fragility function can be defined in terms of 
limit state probability as:
For QRA, Performance levels based on Loss of Content are needed
Risk State (RS) 
RS3 (Minor risk): release from a 10 mm equivalent diameter
RS2 (Severe risk): complete release of inventory in 10 min
RS1 (Instant risk): instantaneous release of entire inventory
Equipment Fragility based on PGA










P) t PGAlnPGA|RSRSP i
N RS DS Tank FL Fragility Fragility
P E
1  t 2 ≥2 Anchored Near Full 0,300 0,600
2 3 ≥4 Anchored Near Full 1,250 0,650
3  t 2 ≥2 Anchored t 0,710 0,800
4 3 ≥4 Anchored t 3,720 0,800
5  t 2 ≥2 Unanchored Near Full 0,150 0,700
6 3 ≥4 Unanchored Near Full 0,680 0,750
7  t 2 ≥2 Unanchored t 0,150 0,120
































Buried pipeline should be related to Peak Ground Velocity
5353
Natech Risk: Earthquake
Given a specific equipment, for each Risk State, the annual 
cumulative probability of Loss of Content (RS), is  given by the 
combination of the vulnerability function and the Seismic Hazard 
function h(IM)
Tsunami characterisation: Water wave (velocity, inundation depth) and debris
26STREST meeting – Thessaloniki (GrR) October, 12-14 2015
NOAA
Natech Risk: Tsunami
Analogy with flooding: damage probability as function of total pressure, 
thus a function of water velocity and water height
27STREST meeting – Thessaloniki (GrR) October, 12-14 2015
Natech Risk: Tsunami























Energy flux, J/m2   [=ρhwvw2]
D = 7.50 m; H = 14.40 m; C = 636 m3
D = 15.00 m; H = 3.60 m; C = 636 m3
D = 9.00 m; H = 16.20 m; C = 1030 m3
D = 13.50 m ; H = 7.20 m; C = 1030 m3
Impact as Energy Flux [J/m2]
Atmospheric tanks
Natech Risk: Tsunami
Target material kS kL a b
Concrete 1.8·10-5 1.0·10-3 0.4 1.5
Brickwork 2.3·10-5 2.5·10-3 0.4 1.5
Steel 6.0·10-5 5.0·10-5 0.3 1.0
29STREST meeting – Thessaloniki (GrR) October, 12-14 2015
Natech Risk: Tsunami
ܦ݁݌ݐ݄ ݋݂ ݌݁݊݁ݐݎܽݐ݅݋݊ τ ܾݕ ݏ݈݈݉ܽ and large ݂ݎܽ݃݉݁݊ݐ
݉, ܣ ൌ ݉ܽݏݏ ܽ݊݀ ܽݎ݁ܽ ݋݂ ݂ݎܽ݃݉݁݊ݐ
ݑ݋ ൌ ݒ݈݁݋ܿ݅ݐݕ ݋݂ ݂ݎܽ݃݉݁݊ݐ
30STREST meeting – Thessaloniki (GrR) October, 12-14 2015
Steel Keel Weight ≈ 100 kg
Surface = 2 m2
Tsunami Wave Velocity = 5 m/s
Depth = 3 m
 ζlarge = 8 mm ≈ thickness of low section of atm tanks
Natech Risk: Tsunami
5454
Tsunami Wave damages by Johnson number
31STREST meeting – Thessaloniki (GrR) October, 12-14 2015
m = mass of fragment
r =  fragment characteristic dimension
u = velocity of fragment at the impact
θ = target wall thickness
σ = dynamic yield stress of target
L = characteristic lenght of target (p = partial)
Natech Risk: Tsunami






1 ൅ ln ܮܮ௣
Joint venture between Q8/ENI 
Capacity: 8.0 million tons/y
Milazzo Refinery, Sicily (Italia)
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
The refinery can berth supertankers
Front view from Milazzo
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
Flammable Gas and Liquid connection (pipework, loading arm) from the main site (storage, production) to berth
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
35
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
36
AREA I
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
5555
37
AREA II: Refining Units
1. Atmospheric Distillation
2. Vacuum Distillation
3. FCC (Fluid catalytic cracking)
4. Hydrocracking unit




QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
Pressurised equipment, small scale 
(in terms of hazmat), safety
instrumented systems for rapid
shut-off
38
AREA III: Storage Units
170 floating roof tank: 4 million m3
TANK PRODUCT DIAM. HEIGHT C A P A C I T Y   ( m3 )
CRUDE 97 22 160,000
GASOIL 82.2 19 100,000
FUEL OIL 61 17 50,000
GASOLINE 61 17 50,000
NAPHTHA 24 15 7,000
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
39
Area IV: Mounded Storage Unit
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
TK 513 – Virgin Naphta
Large Fire on 27 - 30/9/2014
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
TK 513 – Virgin Naphta
Large Fire on 27 - 30/9/2014
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
Earthquake, Tsunami
NATURAL HAZARD
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
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PGV
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 















QRA Study for a refinery in Italy QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) 
The area around Milazzo was discretized into a grid of forty-eight points (potential 
seismic event epicenters) with a grid spacing of approximately 25 km
Hazard curve for Milazzo in terms of PGA exceedance
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
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The 1908 Messina earthquake and tsunami took about 123,000 lives, in Sicily 
and Calabria, southern Italy.  
…The gazometer was destroyed, with a dramatic fire fed by furious wind... 
[CdS 29/12/1908] 
NaTech
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
At 13:55, two petrol ships berthed in Milazzo moved laterally (slipped) for 10m, broke 
their moorings (4 wires) even disconnecting the loading arm, and eventually releasing 
diesel oil into the sea
Tsunami in Sicily (Stromboli) in 2002, 30th Dec
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
Italian National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology
Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis (PSHA) 
Numerical analysis of tsunami hazard in the area of Milazzo
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
A) Maximum wave height distribution originated from the crustal event indicated with the red star (M=8.0);
B) Time history of the corresponding wave height for one randomly selected receiver
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
Maximum flow depth distribution originated from the crustal event indicated with the red star (M=8.0)
TANK PRODUCT TYPE DIAM. HEIGHT C A P A C I T Y   ( m3 )
( m ) ( m ) Geometric
1 HVGO FR 54.9 16 36,000
2 VAC RESIDUE FR 54.9 16 36,000
3 ATM RESIDUE FR 54.9 16 36,000
4 ATM RESIDUE FR 54.9 16 36,000
5 HVGO FR 54.9 16 36,000
6 HVGO FR 54.9 16 36,000
7 HVGO FR 61 16 47,000
8 ATM RESIDUE FR 61 16 47,000
9 HVGO FR 61 16 47,000
21 GASOIL FR 18.3 13 3,300
23 NAPHTHA FR 18.3 13 3,300
25 NAPHTHA FR 18.3 13 3,300
26 OTHERS FR 18.3 13 3,300
27 OTHERS FR 18.3 13 3,300
28 OTHERS FR 18.3 13 3,300
29 OTHERS FR 18.3 13 3,300
30 OTHERS TF 18.3 13 3,300
31 OTHERS FR 18.3 13 3,300
32 FUEL OIL FR 18.3 13 3,300
33 FUEL OIL FR 18.3 13 3,300
34 FUEL OIL TF 11.2 12.5 1,100
35 FUEL OIL TF 11.2 12.5 1,100
36 FUEL OIL TF 11.2 12.5 1,100
37 FUEL OIL TF 11.2 12.5 1,100
38 FUEL OIL TF 11.2 12.5 1,100
39 FUEL OIL TF 11.2 12.5 1,100
40 GASOIL FR 11.2 12.2 1,100
41 GASOLINE FR 11.2 12.2 1,100
42 GASOIL FR 11.2 12.2 1,100
43 GASOLINE FR 11.2 12.2 1,100
44 GASOIL FR 11.2 12.2 1,100
45 GASOLINE FR 11.2 12.2 1,100
46 GASOIL FR 11.2 12.2 1,100
47 JET/KERO FR 11.2 12.2 1,100
48 GASOIL FR 11.2 12.2 1,100
49 FUEL OIL FR 11.2 12.5 1,100
52 GASOLINE FR 39.2 13 15,000
53 GASOLINE FR 39.2 13 15,000
54 GASOLINE FR 39.2 13 15,000
55 GASOLINE FR 39.2 13 15,000
56 GASOLINE FR 39.2 13 15,000
57 GASOLINE FR 39.2 13 15,000
58 FUEL OIL FR 24.4 14.6 7,000
59 GASOIL FR 24.4 14.6 7,000
60 OTHERS FR 24.4 14.6 7,000
61 OTHERS FR 24.4 14.6 7,000
62 GASOIL FR 54.9 16.0 36,000
63 FUEL OIL FR 54.9 16 36,000
64 GASOIL FR 54.9 16.0 36,000
65 FUEL OIL FR 54.9 16 36,000
67 FUEL OIL FR 39.3 13.1 15,000
68 GASOIL FR 39.3 13.1 15,000
69 FUEL OIL FR 39.3 13.1 15,000
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
5858
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 






1 000-5 000 3 000
5 000-10 000 7 500
10 000-113 318 62 000
QRA Study for a refinery in Italy 
Results are however based on standards (coloured books): it may be only used
as a comparative tool for licensing, land use planning
Results






Tsunami damages a 
limited number of 
equipment along shore 
line 









 Existing NaTech guidelines and standards concern the Return-to-Service 
or Serviceability Limit States (as in Hazus)
 New vulnerability functions are needed, Loss of Content being the 
dipendent variable
 Natech risks may weight even more than industrial-related risks, 
particularly for oil&gas and chemical industry
 Detailed Natech analysis needs multi-disciplinary expertise
 Acceptability criteria are the nub of the problem for industrial and NaTech 
risks
 For some natural disasters, early warning may be essential: emergency
plan can be operating well before the occurrence of the event
Conclusions Conclusions
Thank you for your attention!
ernesto.salzano@unibo.it
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Oil and gas releases during large
earthquakes and tsunami
- A research initiative of Osaka University
for disaster prevention in petrochemical complex -
Shin-ichi AOKI & Naomi KATO, Osaka University
1 2
Osaka Bay
Area: 1,500 km2 (60km x 30km)
Volume: 42 km3
River discharge: 13 km3/year
Mean water depth: 28 m
Max. water depth: 197 m







Topography around Osaka Bay
3
Inundation area 
in Osaka due to 
5m sea level rise
(w/o sea walls) 
4
Chilean Tsunami (1960)
Tsunami came one day after the earthquake in Chili.
Because of lack of information of tsunami,100 people died.
Historical Disasters by Storm Surge
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Typhoon 2nd Muroto, 1961
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Fault model of Case-6
Initial rise of sea bottom of Case-6






















- Considering subsidence of seawalls
- Seawalls are destroyed by overflow
- Considering gate operation
Industrial parks will be inundated 
by the largest tsunami
Water level variation by tsunami
Inundation depth
Prediction by Japan coast guard




Research Initiative for Disaster Prevention of Petrochemical Complex
Outbreak: Study on mechanism and model development
- Simulation of sloshing and evaluation of oil spill
- Hydrodynamic force on a tank and its failure mechanism
- Modeling fire and explosion of oil in a tank or sea surface
Propagation: Study on process and integrated model
- Simulation of tsunami and diffusion of spilt oil
- Radiation of heat and hazardous materials
- Simulation of ship evacuation, drift, collision
Inland Propagation Offshore Propagation
Countermeasures (sea area)
- Tsunami reduction by flexible pipes
- Protection by water curtain
- Usage of dispersing agent
- Information system for spilt oil
Countermeasures (land area)
- Blocking tsunami by earth fill
- Protection by water curtain
- Prevention against failure of a tank
- Risk communication with residents
Method of Research
• Numerical simulation using some
mathematical models and CFD
Æ validation of the model
• Laboratory experiments for scaled models
Æ similarity, scale effect
16
Oil spill from a storage tank by sloshing using MPS









Number of tanks 






30 (15-44) Yes 6.2 205 1,271 
50 (45-64) Yes 75.6 28 2,117 
70 (65-84) Yes 801.3 29 23,238 
Total of outflow amount of oil from the industrial complex 26,626 
Simulation of oil spill by sloshing in a storage tank
Estimate of total 
oil spill in an 
industrial park
6363
Laboratory experiments on hydrodynamic forces by 








2D Experiments on a tsunami wave force acting on a tank
20
Inundation coef. vs. Froude number
Drag coef. vs. Froude number
Sakai-Senboku Area
 Izumi-Otsu City Hall
 Takaishi City Hall
 Sakai City Hall
Numerical simulation of tsunami propagation and dispersion
of spilt oil
Osaka Port
 JR Osaka Stn.
 USJ  JR Namba Stn.
 Sumiyoshi Park
Numerical simulation of tsunami propagation and dispersion
of spilt oil
Numerical simulation of heat radiation and gas 
diffusion from a tank
23 24
Numerical simulation of heat radiation and gas 
diffusion from a tank
6464
Analysis of ship behavior by AIS data
25
N 
Evacuation behavior of ships under tsunami
Waiting ships moored in Osaka Bay
AIS: Automatic Identification System
26Ship condition around the industrial park
Target area: Osaka Bay
Date of investigation䠖
03/06/2012: no wind
04/03/2012: wind speed > 20m/s
Analysis of ship behavior by AIS data











In case of 
tsunami
28
Experiments for reduction of tsunami wave force by flexible pipes
Blocking tsunami by an earth bank
29 30
Outreach activities
Exchange of opinions with residents near the industrial park
6565
Development of simulation tool for 
fire spread on floating oil in tsunamis 
Natech workshop (2017/03/13)





occurred on March 11, 2011 (89)
Investigated by Japan Association for Fire 
Science and Engineering
Runup height
0 5 10 15m
200km
JMA Seismic Intensity Scale
2
Tsunami-induced fires in the 2011 Earthquake
| 89 ignitions occurred in tsunami inundation areas on March 11.













(Details of fire spread are not clear) 
࣭oil
࣭debris
Tsunami-induced fires in the 2011 Earthquake
| Some fires spread to tsunami refuge buildings and high grounds.
| Measures against tsunami-induced fires are not sufficient.
| There is no method for predicting tsunami-induced fires.
4
Problems
Marine type fires around the tsunami 
refuge building (provided by Ryosuke Onodera)
Tsunami refuge building damaged by 






Water depth and velocity
Tsunami simulation
Number and initial locations of debris




≪Land-type fire spread simulation≫
Building washout model
Fire ignition model





JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (A), FY2015-FY2017 
Input
Fire damage of 
tsunami refuge buildings
6
Validation of drift and accumulation model
N

















Eventual range of accumulation
Nishino et al., Fire Technology, 2016
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7Validation of fire ignition model
| Statistical model based on the ignition record in the 2011 Tsunami.
| Explanatory variables related to the spill amount of combustibles.
݌ ݕ௜ ߣ௜ ൌ
ߣ௜௬೔݁ݔ݌ െߣ௜
ݕ௜!
ߣ௜ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ െߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݔଵ ൅ ߚଶݔଶ ൅ ߚଷݔଷ ൅ ݎ௜
ݔଵ :  number of automobiles carried away by tsunamis
ݔଶ :  number of gas-cylinder use households carried away by tsunamis












Nishino et al., J. Environ Eng., AIJ, 2015 (in Japanese)
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0 0.5 1 2kmN
Burned-out area
Inundation area
Discovery locations of 






: Building fire (0.2ha)
F2
: Land-type tsunami-induced fire (10.2ha)
F3
: Land-type tsunami-induced fire (0.5ha)
F4
: Land-type tsunami-induced fire (3.6ha)
F5
: Marine-type tsunami-induced fire (-)
F5-1
: Forest fire (114.1ha)
- Marine type F5 spread to the forest.
F5-2
: Building fire (1.2ha)
- Marine type F5 spread to the building.
F5-3
: Ship fire (-)
- Marine type F5 spread to the ship.
F5-4
: Forest fire (117.0ha)









Oil-controlled combustion phaseDebris-controlled combustion phase
(oil is already burned out)
Provided by Ryosuke Onodera
Provided by Ryosuke Onodera








0 5 10 15 20
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Consideration
| Fire front moved 2km on Kesennuma Bay in 20min (1.7m/s).
| Water velocity in tsunamis is 1-10m/s.
| Flame spread rate over oil floating on water is up to 10mm/s.  





















fire is regarded as the 
phenomenon that burning oils 
ignite surrounding oils in the 
process of being transported 
by tsunamis (not simple flame 








Fire spread model on floating oil in tsunamis
| Fires on the sea is an assembly of burning floating oil particles.
| Locations of individual particles are predicted in time series.
| Combustions of individual particles are predicted in time series.
| Overall burning zone is tracked. 























(1) Tsunami inundation flow is already known.
(2) Locations, time and rate of oil spills are already known.
(3) Oil floats on the water (oil and water are clearly separated).
(4) Oil is an assembly of disc-like particles with uniform thickness.
























(6) Oil particles travel horizontally due to the interface friction 
and the turbulence in water flow.
܆௢,௜ ൌ ܆௢,௜ூ ൅ නܝ௢,௜݀ݐ
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Assumptions
(7) Locations and time of first ignition is already known.
(8)  Combustion continues when thickness is not smaller than 1mm.
(9)  Mass loss rate due to combustion depends on the heat balance


























(10) Burning zones of particles spread in axial symmetry.




























0.001 ൑ ݀௢,௜ ൏ 0.007
0.007 ൑ ݀௢,௜
The experimental data is approximated.
(Guo et al., Chinese Science Bulletin, 2012)
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Assumptions
(12)  Fire spread between particles occurs when burning zones
contact with unburned particles.
(13) Wind effect on the combustion is ignored.






















































Initial volume of particles 0.001m3
Number of particles 7,532,000 (=7,532kL) *
Density of particles 814kg/m3
Friction coefficient 0.006 (Lau et al., 1979)
Spill locations 11 discovery points of tanks * 
Spill rate 0.2m3/s (convenient assumption)
Start time of spills 50min after the earthquake





































































0 0.5 1 2km
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| Modeling of fire spread on floating oil in tsunamis.
| Numerical analysis of tsunami-induced fire spread in Kesennuma.
| Qualitative trend of fire spread was well predicted.
| Future challenges
z Model extension including the combustion of floating debris.
z Radiation and plume modeling





NATECH 2017 - The 3rd International Symposium on Natural 
and Technological Risk Reduction at Large Industrial Parks
Department of Chemical Engineering &
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
School of Engineering
Modelig the complexity of risk 
management in pipelines
F. Muñoz & M. Sanchez-Silva
2/58
NATECH 2017 - The 3rd International Symposium on Natural 
and Technological Risk Reduction at Large Industrial Parks
Contents
1. Objective and scope
2. Assessment of systems subject to multiple natural hazards
3. Pipeline evaluation: case study
4. Cost-efficient design: Life-cycle cost analysis, evolution and changeability 
5. Conclusions
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Objective and scope
Objective and scope
• Present a comprehensive approach to modeling pipeline failure 
probability due to natural hazards (GeoRisk).
• Discuss conceptually some ideas regarding risk management of
complex systems subject to highly uncertain events. 
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Dimensionality of events & decision criteria 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards
• Definition of the state variables (space):
• Managing problem complexity:
• Nature and scope of the decision
• Precision and relevance of the model
Definition of the decision space:
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Dimensionality of events 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards






• Seismic events (Peak Ground
acceleration/displacement/velocity)
• Flooding (Water level and flow rate)
• Landslides (volume and mass
displaced)
• Volcanic activity (seismic activity,
piroclastic flux, emissions)…
Physical nature of event, n.
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Dimensionality of events 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards






• Seismic events (Peak Ground
acceleration/displacement/velocity)
• Flooding (Water level and flow rate)
• Landslides (volume and mass
displaced)
• Volcanic activity (seismic activity,
piroclastic flux, emissions)…
Physical nature of event, n. Temporal dimensionality, t.
Long-term (events that occur rarely):





Local (inmminent or high frequent events):
• Temperature variations






Short-term: events whose occurrence is inminent
Mid-term:    events that occur occationally
Long-term:  events that occur rarely
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Dimensionality of events 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards






• Seismic events (Peak Ground
acceleration/displacement/velocity)
• Flooding (Water level and flow rate)
• Landslides (volume and mass
displaced)
• Volcanic activity (seismic activity,
piroclastic flux, emissions)…
Physical nature of event, n. Temporal dimensionality, t.
Long-term (events that occur rarely):





Local (inmminent or high frequent events):
• Temperature variations





Size and spatial dimensionality, s.
Global (cover a large area):
• Seismic events
• Troppical storms and hurricanes
Regional (localized within a well defined 
area):
• Flooding








Short-term: events whose occurrence is inminent
Mid-term:    events that occur occationally
Long-term:  events that occur rarely
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Dimensionality & decision criteria





The scope of every study is defined within a space         such that
Color – nature of the event
Size  – spatial extent of the event
Approach to modeling multiple hazards
pdf
Short-term: events whose occurrence is inminent
Mid-term:    events that occur occationally
Long-term:  events that occur rarely
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Dimensionality of events & decision criteria 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards
• Definition of the state variables (space) {t, s, n}
• Managing problem complexity
7171
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Dimensionality of events & decision criteria 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards
Managing problem complexity       and
Lower Precision
Larger number of interactions
Difficult to model and understand





System complexity: systems consisting of many parts which interact in 
multiple ways leading to emerging patterns of behaviour.
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Dimensionality of events & decision criteria 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards
Managing problem complexity
System complexity: systems consisting of many parts which interact in 
multiple ways leading to emerging patterns of behaviour.
Structured hierarchical decision process
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Dimensionality of events & decision criteria 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards
Managing problem complexity
System complexity: systems consisting of many parts which interact in 
multiple ways leading to emerging patterns of behaviour.
Structured hierarchical decision process
Initial evaluation level
(defined by the resources available and 
the decision needs)
16/58
NATECH 2017 - The 3rd International Symposium on Natural 
and Technological Risk Reduction at Large Industrial Parks
Dimensionality of events & decision criteria 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards
Managing problem complexity
System complexity: systems consisting of many parts which interact in 
multiple ways leading to emerging patterns of behaviour.
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Dimensionality of events & decision criteria 
Approach to modeling multiple hazards
Managing problem complexity
System complexity: systems consisting of many parts which interact in 
multiple ways leading to emerging patterns of behaviour.



















• Resources and evidence are syncronized with
decision makers’ needs.
• Decisions are controlled by the relationship
between relevance and precision.
• It is not necessesray to carry out a detailed
analysis from the begining.
• Resources invested in evidence collection can
be optimized.
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Objective and scope
Develop an integrated model to evaluate the risk of pipelines subjected 
to multiple natural hazards (GeoRisk).
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Main Research team:
Asc. Professor Felipe Muñoz, PhD
Asc. Professor Nicolás Estrada, PhD
Asc. Professor Luis A. Camacho, PhD
Professor Bernanrdo Caicedo, PhD
Professor Mauricio Sánchez-Silva, PhD
Local Experts:
Professor Manuel García Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Professor Jaime I. Ordoñez, Universidad Nacional de Colombia
International Experts:
Professor KK Phoon (NUS-Singapore)
Professor Joaquim Casal (UPB- Barcelona, Spain)
Professor Emeritus Willy Alvarenga (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro)
Project funded by ECOPETROL (Colombian Oil Company)
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t = t + 't
No









Statistical & general inforation
Start
No












Pipeline evaluation: case study
Overall evaluation strategy
Notes:
• all three analysis are associated to different 
decision needs;
• the tools requiered in every case may be different;
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Examples Pipe failure Potential landslide Erosion
Active landslide Local scour Climate change









Long term strategic 
decisions.
Consequences Direct (immediate) costs 
Brand impact
Impact on system operation; 
and stable state revenew.
Ctastrophic damage
High impact/low probability
Dimensionality of events & decision criteria 
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
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Objective and scope
Develop an integrated model to evaluate the risk of pipelines subjected 
to multiple natural hazards.
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Decision & evaluation space{n, t, s}
1. Nature of the event (n) – Landslides; i.e., soil mass 
movement that might cause a break-up of the pipeline. 
(scour and flooding were also studied)
2. Time window (t) – events observed within a five-year period;
3. Spatial characterization (s):
• sector Medellín-Cartago (Col), length: 240 km
















 probability & consequences
t = t + 't
No









Statistical & general inforation
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Objective and scope
Develop an integrated model to evaluate the risk of pipelines subjected 
to multiple natural hazards.
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Structured hierarchical decision process
1. Decisions to be made: 
i) identify critical regions; 
ii) preliminary estimative of failure probability;
iii) define inspection needs; and
iv) define further evaluation requirements.
1. The analysis is limited to landslides and scour problems 
(inhere we present only the landslide model). Intermediate 
eval. level
Approximate model useful to 
define further management 
actions.
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Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
Analysis and results:
1. Landslide probability
2. Pipeline failure probability
7373
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1. Topography: Set of spacial positions of the nodes.
40 km - Medellín 40 km - Cartago
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
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1. Topography: Set of spacial positions of the nodes.
2. Geotechnical information: spatial distribution, thickness, soil type mechanical and 
hydraulic properties.
Definition of the soil type from a set of 
specified points
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
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1. Topography: Set of spacial positions of the nodes.
2. Geotechnical information: spatial distribution, thickness, soil type mechanical and 
hydraulic properties.
Soil thickness alternative models:
Option 1: Map of soil thickness
Option 2: Definition of soil subtypes
Opción 3: Calculate the soil thickness as a 
function of the terrain slope,
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
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1. Topography: Set of spacial positions of the nodes.
2. Geotechnical information: spatial distribution, thickness, soil type mechanical and 
hydraulic properties.




Rate of change of the conductivity with depth:
Initial storage in the roots zone:
Maximum storage in the roots zone:
Speed of water through the main channel:
The mechanical and hydraulic 
parameters can be specified as 
constant values or as probability 
distributions.
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
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1. Topography: Set of spacial positions of the nodes.
2. Geotechnical information: spatial distribution, thickness, soil type mechanical and 
hydraulic properties.
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
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1. Topography: Set of spacial positions of the nodes.
2. Geotechnical information: spatial distribution, thickness, soil type mechanical and 
hydraulic properties.
3. Hydrology: Dairy rain records for rainy, average, and dry seasons, and probability 
transition matrix between these seasons.
Dry seasonRainy season
Transition probability matrix: probability of moving from 
one season to another (defined based on historic 
records)
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
The analysis was carried out for a 
period of 5 years during whicha 
train of  alternative rainy and dry 
conditions were combined 
according to the transition 
probability matrix.  
The water table depth is calculated using the 
semi-distributed hydrology-topography model 
(Topmodel). 
(Beven, 2001; Romanowiczet al., 1993, 1994; Beven et al., 1995).
7474
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1. Topography: Set of spacial positions of the nodes.
2. Geotechnical information: spatial distribution, thickness, soil type mechanical and 
hydraulic properties.
3. Hydrology: Dairy rain records for rainy, average, and dry seasons, and probability 
transition matrix between these seasons.
Most critical water table Average water table
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
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1. Topography: Set of spacial positions of the nodes.
2. Geotechnical information: spatial distribution, thickness, soil type mechanical and 
hydraulic properties.
3. Hydrology: Dairy rain records for rainy, average, and dry seasons, and probability 
transition matrix between these seasons.




Pipeline evaluation: case study
Pipeline evaluation model and case study
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Computing the probability of landslide
2. Rotational failure surface: stability analysis 
performed for for nodes whose thickness is above 
a certain threshold.
1. Planar failure surface: stability 
analysis performed for  every node.
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Analysis & results
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40 km - Medellín 40 km - Medllín
Heavy rainfall scenario Dry scenario
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Analysis & results
Computing the probability of landslide
35/58
NATECH 2017 - The 3rd International Symposium on Natural 
and Technological Risk Reduction at Large Industrial Parks
40 km - Medellín
Heavy rainfall scenario – correspondance with observed landslides
Pipeline evaluation: case study
Analysis and results
Computing the probability of landslide
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• Fl or Ft : force per unit length (transverse or longitudinal),
• Dd is the landslide diameter,
• t is the pipeline wall thickness,
• E is its Young modulus and Dt is its diameter.
• ߠ is the angular difference between between the orientati
of the landslide and that of the pipeline.




Strain capacity in tension:
Strain capacity in compresion:
7575
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Design and performance of infrastructure
Modeling structural degradation is an essential component of 





























cost efficient model 
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Design and performance of infrastructure
Modeling structural degradation is an essential component of 




























Detail and cost 
efficient model useful 
to define further 
management 
actions.
The model has to be dynamic 
and should evolve with time.
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R(t) = P(V(t) > k*)
















Reliability evaluation – time to failure
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only after failure System’s reliability: 
R(t) = P(V(t) > k*)








R(t) = P(L > t)
PDF
Time
Lifetime distribution of 
















Design and performance of infrastructure
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Cost-efficient design: life-cycle analysis
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Objective function:
Cost-based optimization  problem
Costs of losses
(i.e., future investments) 
Optimization
(Maximize the expected NPV)
Requires understanding and modeling the 
structural performance over time.
tm – time mission; G(t) – discount function.
Cost-efficient design: life-cycle analysis
Note: this is evaluated at the end 
of the lifetime
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Limitations of Life Cycle Analysis: some key points
• Defining the life of large infrastructure is not always possible, specially for public
projects; they last until a “political” decision is made.
• The reference time is extremely long to make accurate estimations of most
parameters.
• Financial analysis in current LCA is simplistic; e.g., ; future investments are fixed
from the outset (estimating future cash flows is very difficult); and discounting is 
assumed to be constant.
• Decisions about operation and management can rarely be anticipated beyond 
reasonable (easy to handle) time horizons; and change permanently as new 
information becomes available.
Cost-efficient design: life-cycle analysis
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Complexity of infrastructure management
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Important aspects in modeling the complexity of interactions 
(ideas for discussion)
i) Decisions on infrastructure operation are made based on a combination of
short, mid and long term reference time frames.
i) There are many actors whose decisions, cannot be anticipated.
ii) Maintaining and providing value to the system depends highly on the 
perception and interests of stakeholders.
iii) Large engineering projects need to be modeled as multi-objective problems 
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evolution to handle 
unforeseen events
Value
Engineering Future design 
and operation
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Evolution of Design and LCA models
Key terms related to changeability
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Complexity of decisions
Adaptability/flexibility: a perspective from Biology
• Live beings have survived for millions of years despite their limited mid and long
term capacity for making predictions.
• Live beings can manage unplanned events and challenges depending only on their 
flexibility and ability to modify its structure. 
• Adaptability (i.e., evolution) is designed to be in-effective in a short run (i.e. 
introducing mutations very often will only take you out of the current-local optimality); 
• Evolution is effective in a long-run (explores the solution space and allows for the
features that will be helpful if the environment changes). Note that adaptability of 
species occurs mostly across and not within generations.
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Adaptability/flexibility will include new objectives in the design and operation of 
engineering systems; for instance, it will aim at (for discussion):
1. Differing unnecessary initial provisions, with the respective costs; thus, reducing the
uncertainty associated to decisions; 
2. Having the flexibility (physical and managerial) required to cope with unknown 
scenarios more effectively.
1. Avoiding the concept of optimality in the traditional sense; aiming only at best 
decisions (adding or preserving value) with the information available at every 
decision point.
2. Modifying its structure and management strategies based on the experiences and
knowledge acquired over time.
3. …
Complexity of decisions
Adaptability/flexibility within the engineering context
7878
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Criteria and tools for risk management in context
Cost-efficient design: life-cycle analysis




































NATECH 2017 - The 3rd International Symposium on Natural 
and Technological Risk Reduction at Large Industrial Parks
Contents
1. Objective and scope
2. Assessment of systems subject to multiple natural hazards
3. Pipeline evaluation: case study




NATECH 2017 - The 3rd International Symposium on Natural 
and Technological Risk Reduction at Large Industrial Parks
Conclusions
Conclusions
1. GeoRisk is a tool that provides both a technical and conceptual framework to
manage a diverse number of Natech problems.
1. The design and operation of industrial infrastructure goes beyond technical 
issues. It is not possible to build efficient infrastructure without a  broader 
approach to the problem.
2. Any system (engineered or not) may not be able to fulfilling its purpose if it does 
not improve its ability to cope with new information (e.g., new demands), learn 
and improve its capabilities, and adapt its structure to be more efficient. 
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Thanks!
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Pipeline evaluation: case study
Scope of event decisions 
Temporal dimensionality
Description time Event Approach







Mechanistic & prob. 
approach


















































































Decontamination in Fukushima City 2016.10
How Contamination is Measured
2,700 units placed in Fukushima prefecture 
(in the city, 368 units)


































































Annex 4:   
Number of Participants per Country  
and Participant Affiliations       
84
85
Country No. Participants Affiliation 
Afghanistan 1 Marina Hamidzada DPRI 
Bulgaria 1 Toma Stoyanov Kyoto University 
China 1 Liuyi Zhang DPRI 
Colombia 4 Jaime Pacheco First Secretary of the Colombian 
Embassy in Japan 
Felipe Muñoz  Universidad de los Andes 
 Mauricio Sánchez Universidad de los Andes 
María Camila Suarez Paba DPRI 
Egypt 2 Ahmed Ibrahim Kyoto University 
Mohamed Abdel DPRI 
Germany 1 Uta Reichardt DPRI 
India 1 Sandhya Babel Thammasat University 
Italy 4 Valerio Cozzani Università di Bologna 
 Ernesto Salzano Università di Bologna 
 Elizabeth Krausmann Joint Research Center, European 
Commission 
 Giuseppe Aliperti DPRI 
Japan 16 Kaoru Takara DPRI 
Ana Maria Cruz DPRI 
Shin-Ichi Aoki Osaka University 
Naomi Kato Osaka University 
Daniel Cardoso Osaka University 







Dewi Dimyati Kyoto University 
Kaori Horikomi  DPRI 
Sasha Yoshioka  Kyoto University 
Hitomu Kotani  DPRI 
Mexico 1 Irasema Alcantara‐Ayala  National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) 
Philippines 1 Angelica Baylon MAAP 






This publication is the multi-perspective 
contributions and international experiences
presented at Kyoto University, Uji Campus, in 
March 2017, within the framework of the
Workshop on Tools for Natech Risk Management.
The organizer of the workshop was the Disaster 
Prevention Research Institute (DPRI), Kyoto
University. 
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